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ERMA PACE,
Defendant and Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF

FACTUAL AND ANALYTICAL MISCONCEPTIONS
IN RESPONDENTS BRIEF
Defense counsel has resorted to a protracted analysis
of the testimony of Erma Pace with regard to her state
of mind at and following the execution of the LeaseSales Agreement on September 8, 1965, and again on
May 22,1967, when the Extension Agreement was signed,
and claims that such testimony supports the trial court's
finding that omission to reserve oil and gas rights in
the agreement was the result of mutual mistake of fact.
Defense counsel has also referred to testimony of defendant's relatives and others regarding so-called oral adDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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missions of plaintiff to the effect that oil and gas rights
were not to go with the land.
As heretofore pointed out, this oral testimony was
inadmissible. If its purpose was to vary the terms of the
written instrument, it was violative of the parol evidence
rule. If its purpose was to inject into the case an oral
agreement to reserve oil and gas rights to defendant, it
was violative of the Statute of Frauds. Fiirthermore, the
testimony of Erma Pace is no stronger than the position
she ultimately took on cross-examination. On cross-examination, she erased any contention she could ever
make either that the document was ambiguous or that
the reservation of oil and gas rights was omitted from
the agreement and overlooked because of inadvertence.
She testified by a voluntary statement as follows:
"Q. (Mr. Black) You were aware very
early in the proceedings of the failure to have
the reservation of oil and gas rights in the document, were you not?
A. I was aware that it should have been
in there before I ever signed it."
Counsel now contends that the parities by using the
word "farm" in the contract intended to reserve the subsurface rights. That argument must fail for three very
basic reasons. First, Erma Pace on cross-examination
conceded that she knew the reservation of oil and gas
rights was not in the document, and also that it should
have been in there. If the word "farm" had had the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

connotation claimed for it by defense counsel, she would
have had no such knowledge and no such concern. Second, there is absolutely no other evidence that Mrs. P&ce
misunderstood the Lease-Sales Agreement or that it was
in any sense ambiguous. Third, it is fundamental and
horn-book law that in a description, the specific governs
the general. This agreement states:
"The Owners have agreed to Lease and subsequently sell to the buyers that certain one
hundred twenty (120) acre irrigated farm located approximately ten miles northwest of the
city of Roosevelt * * * and more particularly described as follows: (Italics ours.) (setting forth legal description).
The foregoing document constituted a conveyance of
an interest in land as that term is defined in Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 57-1-1, which reads
as follows:
"The term 'conveyance' as used in this title
shall be construed to embrace every instrument,
in writing by which any real estate, or interest
in real estate, is created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except wills, and leases for
a term not exceeding one year. (Italics ours.)
The extent of the interest created by the conveyance
is likewise clear from a simple reference to Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 57-1-3, which reads
as follows:
"A fee simple title is presumed to be inDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
tended to pass by a conveyance of real estate,
unless it appears from the conveyance that a
lesser estate was intended." (Italics ours.)
Counsel continues with the unsupportable contention
that plaintiffs had failed to make rental payments on
time under the Lease-Option Agreement, that plaintiffs
had agreed to pay excess charges defendant may have
incurred as a result of not having the money on time,
and that this somehow may have affected the validity
of plaintiff's later exercise of the option. This contention is nothing more nor less than smoke and haze. In
the first place, defendant waived any possible right to
claim default by accepting, banking and using the payments. In the second place, the record is devoid of any
evidence that she in fact suffered any excess charges as
a result of late payments. In the third place, after plaintiff's offer to pay any such excess charges, defendant admitted on cross-examination that she never did submit
to plaintiff a list of so-called excess charges. Again we
ask, how could plaintiff pay excess charges if he had no
knowledge as to their amount? (R. 109, Exhibit 4).
Counsel also makes much of Exhibit 12 executed on
June 1, 1972, by plaintiff, and claims the document, executed almost five months after the exercise of the option,
was somehow an admission on plaintiff's part that he
was making no claim to the oil and gas rights.
It appears from the testimony that plaintiff had
taken the document to Attorney George Mangan in company with a representative of Shell Oil Company before
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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signing same. It had already been prepared. The document shows on its face that the word "surface" had been
scratched out, and Mr. Bench had initialed the deletion.
Mr. Mangan testified as follows:
"The Court: The part scratched out was
'surface'?
A. That word there was surface. I recall
that. This was the thing that gave Mr. Bench
a great deal of difficulty. He did not wish to
sign this document if it in any way was to relinquish any claim or right that he had to the
minerals. And as I recall this conversation we
assured Mr. Bench that we could not pass on
the right that he had to minerals, but that it
would simply agree that he was in possession of
the surface, and that he had an option to purchase, and that it put everyone on notice that
he did have an option to purchase. As to what
he would be actually entitled to receive was a
matter that he would have to work out with Mrs.
P&ce or a Court of law would have to interpret.
As I recall that was the gist of our total conversation" (R. 141, 142). (Italics ours.)
We can't help wondering, in the face of Mr. Mangan's
testimony, as supported by the document itself, why
counsel continues to twist and distort this particular evidence. Is his position really that weak?
Counsel states at page 5 of his brief:
"It was clear from the evidence as a whole
that Mrs. Place did not know that plaintiffs
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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claimed oil, gas and mineral rights in the property until she was served with a copy of the
Complaint in this action (T. 196, 197). The
Court so found (Finding of Fact No. 5 ) / '
This statement brings us back to the fundamental
pitoposition that the Lease-Option Agreement was unambiguous on its face and fully understood by both plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, what Mrs. Pace now
claims to have either known or not known is really of
no consequence.
The attorneys for Mrs, Pace most certainly were
aware of the content of the Lease-Option Agreement
prior to the filing of the Oon^msmz They were the ones
who came up, some two and a half months after the
Option had been fully exercised, with an unnecessary
and superfluous escrow agreement. And they were the
ones who, for the very first time in the long history of
this transaction, stuck in a reservation of oil and gas
rights. Who says an escrow agreement was necessary?
Defense counsel then concludes with the most incredible statement of all:
"Plaintiffs never complied with the requirements of the option, and the lease eventully expired on September 15, 1973, approximately nine
months after this lawsuit was filed."
As for the mechanics of exercising the option, Mrs.
Pace's testimony is the best evidence:
"Q. Now a time came, did it not, Mrs.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Pace, when Mr. Bench presented himself at your
home on or about January 8, 1971, and hand
delivered to you a letter, and in addition to that
hand delivered to you three checks, one a fifty
dollar check, two a six hundred dollar check,
and three a two thousand dollar check representing the down payment on the farm, isn't that
correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. At that time did you read the letter
which he had prepared and delivered to you?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you receive the three checks?
A. I did.
Q. Did you deposit the three checks later
on?
A. I deposited the two thousand dollars,
yes.
Q. At that time did you ever request of
Mr. Bench that an addendum or modification be
entered on the original agreement to include a
reservation of gas and oil rights to you?
(dialogue of counsel)
A. There was nothing until I had that escrow deal drawn up" (R. 106, 107).
It can be seen from the foregoing that every single
requirement of the Lease-Option Agreement was fully
complied with on January 8, 1971 and that it wasn't until
the attorneys, in April of 1971, sent Mr. Bench a proposed Escrow Agreement that Bench, for the first time,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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wias aware that Mrs. P&oe was attempting to attadh new
conditions to an already executed option, one of which
was the indusion of an oil and gas reservation. Again,
we ask, how can a valid contention be made in this case
that the option wasn't exercised in view of the foregoing
uncontested testimony of Mrs. Pace?
POINT I.
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IS MISTAKEN IN HIS CONTENTION THAT THE
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT PREVENT REFORMATION OF THE LEASEOPTION AGREEMENT.
Before considering some of the cases cited by defense counsel in support of his parol evidence position,
we point out that the trial court has never found that
the Lease-Option Agreement was ambiguous. Rather,
the court has found that:
"the lease and option contract through mutual mistake omitted the reservation of the minerals and foiled to conform to the intent of the
parties at the time of the execntion of the instrument * * *•"
And,, as we have pointed out, the interpretatibn
counsel has attempted to impose on the tecrm, "irrigated
farm" as creating an ambiguity is not supported by the
evidence.
Mrs. Pace has precluded herself from the claim of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ambiguity by testifying that before she executed the
document she knew that there was no reservation of oil
and gas rights and that such reservation should have
been in the document. Furthermore, counsel for defendant doesn't even claim that the reservation was left out
of the agreement by inadvertence. Mrs. Pace testified
that she had full knowledge as to the content and meaning of the document.
We take the position that E. A. Strout Western
Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick,
Utah
, 522 P.
2d 144 (1974), is in point, and illustrates that the same
trial judge continues to labor under the same misunderstanding as to the true meaning of the parol evidence
rule. We analyzed the Broderick case at page 12 of Appellants' Brief. But in connection with the Broderick
case, we wish to again point out that in the case at bar
the document was not ambiguous, nor was there any
inadvertent omission overlooked by the parties. Therefore, the parol evidence rule prevented admission of the
testimony pointed out by counsel as being controlling.
Typical of oases cited by counsel for defendant is
that of Crabb v. Chisum, 183 Okl. 138, 80 P. 2d 653. A
mere reference to the language of that case indicates the
distinction.
"the mistake in the notes in that case was
due to an error on the part of the scrivener,
which was not noticed by the plaintiff until long
subsequent to the date of the execution of the
notes." (Emphasis ours.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There was certainly no error on the part of the scrivener which remained unnoticed in the case at bar.
Counsel attempts to fit this case into the framework
of Intermountain Farmers Assn. v. Peart, 30 Utah 2d
201, 515 P. 2d 614 (1973). The Peart case is clearly distinguishable. There the parties had agreed to a conveyance of two acres and the scrivener had mistakenly described a five acre tract. The court, in supporting the
trial court's decision allowing reformation of the deed,
stated:
"Through a mistake of its scrivener the warranty deed executed by the plaintiff to the defendants described the entire five acres. When
the mistake was discovered, plaintiff requested
the defendants to reconvey the excess acreage.
The defendants refused to reconvey, and the
plaintiff instituted these proceedings to reform
the deed."

;•

The Peart case, supra, falls in the same category as
the Crabb case, as a scrivener's error case.
Counsel for defendant cites as supporting his position Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P. 2d 620.
We cited the Naisbitt case in Appellants' Brief. In the
Naisbitt case we are again confronted with a scrivener's
error. The original parties to a deed intended to include
a 130 foot strip in a conveyance, but in describing the
property in the deed they made a mutual mistake. The
decision in the Naisbitt case is particularly interesting
where the court discusses the quantum of proof and the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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foundational facts necessary to support a party's claim
of mutual mistake. The Court stated:
"Evidence necessary to substantiate the
mutual mistake of fact must be clear, definite,
and convincing, and the party seeking reformation should not be guilty of negligence in the
execution of the contract or deed or laches in
making timely application for its reformation."
(Italics ours.)
Erma P&ce was not mistaken as to the meaning of
the Lease-Option Agreement. But one thing is clear. If
she really intended to place a reservation of sub-surface
rights in the agreement she was guilty of laches of the
worst kind. She had many opportunities to reform the
agreement.
(1) She could have amended the agreement by
interlineation at the time she signed it at her home
among her relatives on September 8, 1965.
(2) She could have amended the agreement at the
time she signed the Lease Extension Agreement on May
22, 1967.
(3) She could have amended the agreement as a
condition to receipt of the $2,000.00 when the option was
exercised at her home on January 8, 1971.
Instead, she waited down through the years until
April of 1971 before making any attempt whatsoever
to reform the agreement. On that date her lawyer attempted to insert an oil and gas reservation in an unDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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necessary escrow agreement and threatened to repudiate the option exercise unless the document was signed
by plaintiff.
Naisbitt is in point. It supports plaintiffs' position
on the parol evidence rule. It also supports plaintiffs'
position that defendant, as a matter of law, has failed
utterly to lift her evidence to the necessary level in order
to establish dearly and convincingly that a mutual mistake occured and that she was not guilty of laches in
correcting the mistake.
In this connection we call attention to the case of
George v. Fritsch Loan & Trust Co., 69 Utah 460, 256 P.
400 (1927). In the George case, suit was brought to
enforce specific performance of a written contract for
the sale of real estate. Defendant answered, admitting
that it had executed the written contract and that it was
obligated to convey to plaintiff the land described, but
alleging that the contract did not reflect the intention
of the parties in that by mutual mistake of the parties,
there was omitted from the written contract various provisions to the effect that there was not to be constructed
upon the premises any building except a residence or
apartment house or certain other types of business establishments. Defendant asked for reformation of the
contract to include these provisions. The trial court
allowed evidence of the oral understandings and granted
the reformation. On appeal the case was reversed. The
court stated:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"The general rule is that relief in the way
of reform of a written instrument should not be
granted when the party seeking it has acquiesced
in the written agreement after being aware of
the mistake. 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 981, and cases
therein cited; 34 Cyc. 942, and cases cited in
footnote." (Italics ours.)
Counsel has made reference to the term "justice"
at page 26 of his brief as though defendant and her
counsel had a corner on the justice market. We cannot
refrain from calling attention to the fact that at two
places in his brief, counsel refers to defendant's status
as a widow. There are many widows in this world. Widows, just as architects,, plumbers and college professors
are bound by their bargains and must comply with the
law. We are more than confident — we are certain the
economic or marital status of the defendant or of the
plaintiffs will receive no consideration when the court
determines the issues of this case.
POINT II.

gCL(/Pg

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IS MISTAKEN IN HIS CONTENTION THAT THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS E E E C m B g £ = 4 ^ - ^ ^
P E N D A N T FROM ENFORCING ANY ORAL
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
REGARDING GIVING DEFENDANT OIL
AND GAS RIGHTS ON THE PROPERTY.
Counsel for defendant apparently misunderstands
our position where he attempts to impose upon counsel

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a contention that the Statute of Frauds prevents reformation of a written document. That is not our contention at all. What we say is that if defense counsel has
failed to establish a mutual mistake of fact, he is left
with only one remaining position. That would be that
the parties orally agreed that plaintiff at some future
date would give defendant the oil and mineral rights
to the property. Oil and mineral rights are a part of
the realty and an oral agreement to make a future conveyance of them would clearly violate the Sitatute of
Frauds and would be unenforceable. The case of Papanickolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 272 P&c. 856 (1929),
supports our position as do the other cases we have
cited.
Counsel for defendant states that plaintiffs' argument regarding fraud is a straw-man argument. (See
page 27 of Respondent's Brief.) It is our position that
the whole issue of fraud is a straw-man issue. But, it
is defendant's straw-man issue, not ours. Defendant is
the one who alleged and failed to prove fraud.
POINT III.
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IS MISTAKEN IN HIS CONTENTION THAT THE
OPTION WAS NOT PROPERLY EXERCISED AND THAT PLAINTIFFS ACQUIESCED IN ITS WITHDRAWAL.
Plaintiff has set forth his position concerning exerDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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eise of the option and lack of acquiescence in its withdrawal under Point VII of Appellants' Brief. Nevertheless, ceirtain statements in the Brief of Respondent
would appear to require an answer.
For example, counsel states at page 29:
"At that time, Mr. Bench presented a check
to Mrs. Pace in the amount of $2,000.00, but
Mr. Bench did not tender payment of the late
charges, nor did he tender any probated payment of the $600.00 annual farm lease rental (T.
84)."
The incredible contention that the option exercise
was somehow lacking because no tender of any pro-rated
payment of the $600.00 annual farm lease rental was
made is simply not valid. No witness, including Mrs.
P^ce, ever made such a statement. The return of the
$2,000.00 and the repudiation of the option exercise by
Mrs. Pace's lawyer was certainly not bottomed on such
a contention.
Counsel then states at page 29:
"The parties agreed to enter into a new
agreement which would provide for the sale of
the subject property."
The parties agreed to no such thing!
To put this issue in proper context, the starting
point goes back to January 8, 1971, when plaintiff exercised the option by delivering to defendant the $2,000.00
check, the $600.00 and the $50.00 check. No conditions
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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were attached to these payments. No additional requirements were exacted by Mrs. Pace. Then, almost
three months later, on April 5, 1971, counsel for defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff which, to say the
least, is forceful in nature.
It reads, in part, as follows:
"Also pursuant to the Escrow Agreement,
which Mr. Sam prepared, and which you have a
copy of, would have to be executed, or, you will
merely continue on with the lease until the same
expires by its terms, which would be September 15, of 1973."
The letter goes on to state:
"If you want to exercise the option to purchase the property, then it will be necessary that
you either sign the Escrow Agreement and place
the same at the bank, together with a deed from
Mrs. Pace to be delivered upon the payment of
the contract amount in full, or it will be construed that you have not in fact bought the
property." (Italics ours.)
As the court will recall, the proposed escrow agreement, contrary to the terms of the original agreement,
contained a reservation of oil and gas rights. Mr. Bench,
without benefit of legal counsel, responded to the Beaslin
letter and stated, in part:
"J agreed to lease the property with an option to purchase and the terms of said purchase
were agreed upon by both Owners and Lessee. I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have not signed the papers prepared by Mr. Sam
because these terms are being changed" See Exhibit 8. (Italics ours.)
The next thing that happened was that on June 2,
1971, Mrs. Pfetce sent a letter to plaintiff returning the
$2,000.00. Counsel for defendant claims that the fact
plaintiff accepted the $2,000.00 proves that plaintiff acquiesced in withdrawal of the option exercise. But,
what did plaintiff say in his responsive letter of June
15, 1971? (Exhibit 10).
"It is only our desire and intention to purchase
the farm as per our original Lease-Purchase
agreement and the terms there outlined. Let's
get together and iron out the difference." (Italics ours.)
We submit the evidence clearly shows that Plaintiff
was never willing to accept the refunded money and
abandon his rights under the contract. He was merely
attempting as best he could to compromise a difficulty
he had come to realize existed between the parties to
the agreement. His attempts resulted in failure.
We also point out that at the time the lawsuit was
filed, plaintiff was still within the time for exercising
his option. The case was filed on November 30, 1972,
and the option period would not expire until September
8, 1973,
The prayer of the Complaint asked for specific performance of the contract and declaratory relief stating
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the respective rights of the parties at and prior to the
date of the filing. In other words, plaintiff was asking
for the court to declare that he had properly performed
the requisites of the option or for the right to do so per
the original agreement of the parties of September 8,
1965. The running of the option period subsequent to
the filing of this action can have no bearing on the respective rights of the parties as they existed on November 30, 1972 and prior thereto.
In addition, we take the position that defendant so
conducted herself at and after the $2,000.00 had been
returned and during the time that the option would still
have been in effect that a formal retendering of the $2,000.00 would have been a useless act and as a matter of
law is not a prerequisite to plaintiffs' case.
We cite Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edition, Volume
15, page 447, as follows:
"Sec. 1819. Waiver of Objection to Tender. Under general principles, previously discussed, tender is excused by obstruction or prevention or
imposition of unwarranted conditions by the
person to Whom it was to be made. So where
the obligee has manifested to the obligor that
tender, if made, will not be accepted, the obligor
is excused from making tender as it would be <£ *£
most merely a futile gesture."
POINT IV.
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IS MISTAKEN IN HIS CONTENTION THAT THE
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT.
Counsel for defendant cites Stewart Livestock Company v. Potter, 105 U. 529, 144 P. 2d 276 (1943).
This was a vendor's action against a mortgagor, livestock company, and a bank to foreclose a purchase-money
mortgage. An answer pleaded a partial failure of consideration to which the plaintiff replied with a claim
that the Staitute of limitations had run. The Statute
of Limitations defense was not allowed for the reason
that the answer did not ask for affirmative relief. The
court stated:
"The third proposition urged by appellant,
offset or recovery on the cross-demands of defendants was barred by the Statute of Limitations applicable to actions on written instruments,, must likewise fail. Defendants did not
seek any judgment other than the defeat of
plaintiffs claims. Though a claim may be barred
by the Statute of Limitations insofar as the
right to recover a judgment is concerned, such
claim may be set off against an adversary's
claim. (Citing cases,)" (Italics ours.)
There can be no doubt that defendant is asking for
affirmative relief in the form of reformation. (See Respondent's Brief at page 9.) The Statute of Limitations
is, therefore, applicable to the case at bar.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Utah case which we think is of significance is
Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884 (1956).
This was an action to quiet title to realty acquired by
tax deed. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs
and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court held that
the Statute of Limitations respecting actions to recover
property acquired by tax deed was constitutional, and
defendants' defense was barred by such Statute. This
was and is a clear holding that Statutes of limitation
in Utah apply to defenses as well as claims.
As to whether the Statute of Limitations has i*un
factually, counsel again resorts to a bland kind of indifference to the testimony of his own client. He states
at page 36:
"A second weakness in the Statute of Limitations argument arises from the fact that the
fianst time the fraud or mistake in this case was
brought to the attention of the defendant was
when the Complaint was filed/'
Mrs. Pace, however, testified that, "I was aware
that it should have been in there before I ever signed
it." How long will counsel for defendant persist with
his refusal to accept tine foregoing testimony as fact in
this case? We suppose he just hopes it will go away.
CONCLUSION
Defendant was fully aware on September 8, 1965,
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when she and plaintiffs signed the Lease-Sales Agreement that said document contained no reservation of
sub-surface rights, and she made no effort to reform the
instrument. Defendant was fully aware on May 22, 1967,
when the Lease-Extension Agreement was signed that
the original agreement contained no reservation of subsurface rights, and she made no effort to reform the instrument. Defendant was fully aware on January 8,1971,
when she accepted the three checks and the option was
exercised that the original agreement and the Lease Extension Agreement contained no reservation of sub-surface rights, and she made no effort to reform the instrument. But during the two and a half months that followed, an unrest took place in her mind. She saw a lawyer and for the first time the concept of an Escrow
Agreement erected its head. In May of 1971, a proposed
Escrow Agreement was sent to plaintiff containing
changes in the original agreement and for the first time
incorporating a reservation of sub-surface rights. Plaintiff refused to sign. On June 2, 1971, the defendant
returned the $2,000.00 and repudiated the exercise of the
option. Plaintiff attempted to negotiate the dispute and
failed, stating in a letter on June 15, 1971, (Exhibit 10),
"It is only our intention to purchase the farm as per
our original agreement and the terms there outlined."
Within the option period, plaintiff filed a lawsuit
asking for specific performance and declaratory relief
and for an opportunity to exercise the option. DefenDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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dant refused. The oil and gas rights had become valuable. Defense counsel alleged fraud. They failed in their
proof. They alleged mutual mistake and failed in their
proof. They then accused plaintiffs' counsel of "obfuscation" and asked for "justice." We are reminded of the
language in Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western Mining
Company, a Utah case, 80 P. 2d 338, where it is said:
"In this class of cases more than ordinary
diligence is exacted in seeking to enforce hidden
equities and bringing them to the light of day.
A mine of little value today may b y developments or a sudden discovery of rich'ore be of
great, even fabulous, values tomorrow or next
year. The concealed claimant may not then
suddenly spring from his ambuscade of silence,
and exact a division."
It is our position that if the trial court's ruling in
this case is allowed to stand, it will cast suspicion and
doubt upon every sale of a motel, a ranch, a turkey fanm,
a home, or any other piece of real property in the State
of Utah. Parties, after years have elapsed, observing
changes in the values of sub-surface rights, will be allowed to contest established written contractual rights
with claims of oral agreements to reserve sub-surface
rights. And the funadmental common-law policy of
maintaining stability of titles in the field of property
law will have been defeated.
We respectfully take the position that the trial court's
decision in this case should be reversed and plaintiffs
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should be allowed to exercise their option and to purchase
the property in accordance with the original Lease-Sales
Agreement.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS
& BLACK
By WAYNE L. BLACK
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE
JAMES R. BLACK
Attorneys for Appellants
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